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題目：Military Effectiveness and Naval Warfare

作者：Stephen Biddle,哥倫比亞大學國際與公共事務教授、外交關系委員會國防政策兼職高級研究員。John Severini,約翰-塞韋里尼目前是喬治敦大學政府學博士生。

摘要：軍事效率促進了政治學文獻的增長。然而，這些著作絕大多數側重于大陸戰爭。中國的崛起凸顯了海戰。文獻的核心結論是否適用于海戰？我們通過一個關于 1649 年至 1988 年間國家間水面海戰的新數據集來比較海戰和陸戰模式，從而探討這一問題。我們發現，海上和陸地的軍事環境截然不同，這使得海戰結果對物資更加敏感，更加快速，也更加片面，因此兩者存在本質區別。然而，在物質與非物質的相互作用方面也有重要的相似之處。這些特點對未來東亞反介入/區域拒止（A2/AD）戰爭的政策、海軍資源分配中技能和物資投入的平衡以及軍事效能研究都有重要影響。

Military effectiveness created a growth in political science literature. However, this work focused overwhelmingly on continental warfare. China’s rise highlights naval warfare. Do the central findings of the literature hold for war at sea? We explore this question by comparing naval and land combat patterns via a new dataset on interstate surface naval battles fought between 1649 and 1988. We find essential differences deriving from the contrasting nature of the sea and land as military environments, which have made naval outcomes more sensitive to materiel, quicker, and more one-sided. There are, however, also important similarities involving material–nonmaterial interactions. These features pose important implications for policy on future anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) warfare in East Asia, the balance of investment in skill and materiel in naval resource allocation, and research on military effectiveness.

題目：Testing as the Blindspot of Nuclear Nonuse

作者：Ruoyu Li, 約翰霍普金斯大學政治學系。

摘要：太平洋激進派宣稱核試驗就是核使用，這對國際關系（IR）學科中的核不使用概念提出了挑戰。在應對這一挑戰的同時，本文還揭示了有關核試驗的學科盲點，即核試驗與核使用不符。我認為，斯科特·薩根（Scott Sagan）和肯尼斯·華爾茲（Kenneth N. Waltz）關于核威懾的辯論以及妮娜·坦南瓦爾德（Nina Tannenwald）的核禁忌框架所體現的關于不使用核武器的國際關系討論是殖民知識生產的一部分，這種知識生產否定了殖民地人民的政治能動性和人性。本文以美國在馬紹爾群島進行的核武器試驗（1946-58 年）為例，對核試驗進行了后殖民主義的重新詮釋，從而論證了核試驗是核使用的一種形式，特別是核武器的殖民使用。

Pacific activists’ proclamation that nuclear testing is nuclear use poses a challenge to the notion of nuclear nonuse in the discipline of International Relations (IR). While addressing such a challenge, this article reveals a disciplinary blind spot regarding nuclear testing that disqualifies testing from nuclear use. I argue that IR discussions of nuclear nonuse—exemplified by Scott Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz’s debates on nuclear deterrence and Nina Tannenwald’s nuclear taboo framework—are part of the colonial knowledge production that dismisses the political agency and humanity of colonized people. This article then argues that nuclear testing is a form of nuclear use, specifically, the colonial use of nuclear weapons, by developing a postcolonial reinterpretation of nuclear testing in the case of US nuclear weapon tests in the Marshall Islands (1946–58).

題目：Revolutionary Governments, Recklessness, and War: The Case of the Second Karabakh War

作者：Arman Grigoryan,利哈伊大學國際關系系副教授。

摘要：革命政治環境的特點是逆向選擇的壓力。它提升了最激進、最易發生沖突、最樂于冒險的類型，而這些人又教育程度低，缺乏執政經驗。他們是庸俗的反唯物主義者，認為只要付出足夠的努力和毅力，現實就可以按照他們的意愿來改變。革命者擁有宏大的理想和救世計劃，通常不會容忍妥協和討價還價。對他們來說，要實現這些想法，任何代價都不算太高。當革命者接管一個與其他國家發生沖突的國家時，這些傾向很可能也會影響他們對沖突的管理，并可能帶來災難性的后果。亞美尼亞革命政府的外交政策導致了 2020 年第二次卡拉巴赫戰爭和亞美尼亞方面的災難性失敗。

Revolutionary politics is an environment characterized by pressures for adverse selection. It elevates the most radical, conflict-prone, risk happy types, who in addition are poorly educated and inexperienced in government. They are vulgar anti-materialists who think reality can be bent to their will with sufficient effort and perseverance. Revolutionaries are possessed with grandiose ideas and salvation projects, which typically do not tolerate compromise and bargaining. Nor any cost seems too high to them for the realization of such ideas. When revolutionaries take over in a country that has a conflict with another state, these propensities are likely to affect their management of the conflict as well with potentially catastrophic consequences. The argument is illustrated with the diplomacy of Armenia’s revolutionary government, which led to the Second Karabakh War of 2020 and the Armenian side’s catastrophic defeat.

題目：Threat Construction and Coercive Credibility

作者：Danielle L. Lupton, 科爾蓋特大學政治學副教授。

摘要：在國際危機中，行為體如何發出可信的威脅？傳統的學術研究側重于威脅的背景如何影響可信度，而本文則考慮威脅本身的構建如何影響可信度。更具體地說，本文引入了 "威脅理由 "這一概念，并從理論上分析了領導者在傳達威脅時所選擇的解釋是如何影響其強制性可信度的。本研究采用了聯合設計調查實驗，以確定威脅的具體性和嚴重性、公開威脅與私人威脅以及威脅理由對可信度感知的影響。本文發現，更精確的威脅被認為更可信，而采用聲譽理由的威脅可信度較低。有極少量證據表明，公開或私下發出威脅會影響可信度。本文還發現，受眾是國內還是國際，以及危機誘因的嚴重程度都會影響人們對可信度的看法。本研究進一步加深了我們對塑造強制性可信度的因素以及決策者如何在國際危機中最有效地傳達其承諾的理解。

How do actors issue credible threats during international crises? While scholarship has traditionally focused on how the context of threats influences credibility, this paper considers how the construction of the threat itself affects credibility. More specifically, this paper introduces the concept of threat justification and theorize how the choice of explanation a leader uses in communicating her threats can influence her coercive credibility. This study employs a conjoint design survey experiment to identify the influence of threat specificity and severity, public versus private threats, and threat justification on perceptions of credibility. This paper finds that more precise threats are perceived as more credible, while threats employing reputational justifications are less credible. There is a minimal amount of evidence that the public versus private delivery of a threat influences credibility. This paper also finds that perceptions of credibility are influenced by whether the audience is domestic versus international and by the severity of the instigating crisis trigger. This study furthers our understanding of the factors shaping coercive credibility and how policymakers can most effectively convey their commitments during international crises.

題目：Escaping Paralysis: Strategies for Countering Asymmetric Nuclear Escalation

作者：Even Hellan Larsen, 挪威奧斯陸大學政治學系的博士研究員。

摘要：擁有核武器的國家在與擁有核武器的對手進行低級別的沖突時往往猶豫不決，因為害怕引起核反擊。本文將這種情況稱為 "次戰略癱瘓"。核武器國家試圖擺脫這種癱瘓狀態的選擇進行了分類：反價值懲罰戰略通過反價值核報復進行威懾；常規暫停戰略通過常規反應將進一步升級的負擔轉嫁給對手，從而起到威懾作用；損害限制戰略通過在核戰爭中限制損害的能力進行威懾；最后，針鋒相對戰略通過在所有沖突級別上的戰爭制勝能力來進行威懾。為了擺脫次戰略癱瘓，蘇聯和印度在轉向常規停頓戰略之前，最初依賴于反價值懲罰。印度未能擺脫癱瘓狀態，因此開始尋求損害限制戰略。相比之下，美國則奉行針鋒相對的戰略，以消除次戰略癱瘓。

States armed with nuclear weapons are often hesitant to engage in low levels of conflict against rivals armed with nuclear weapons for fear of provoking a nuclear response. I refer to this condition as “substrategic paralysis.” I provide a typology of the options for nuclear weapon states trying to escape this paralysis. A countervalue punishment strategy deters through countervalue nuclear retaliation. A conventional pause strategy deters by shifting the burden of further escalation back onto the adversary with a conventional response. A damage limitation strategy deters through the ability to limit damage in a nuclear war. Finally, a tit-for-tat strategy discourages through a war-winning capability at all conflict levels. To escape substrategic paralysis, the Soviet Union and India initially relied on countervalue punishment before moving toward a conventional pause strategy. India’s failure to escape paralysis triggered a search for a damage limitation strategy. In contrast, the United States pursues a tit-for-tat strategy to neutralize substrategic paralysis.

編譯 | 柳博文

審校 | 賴永禎

排版 | 趙興岳